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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of gender quotas on firm performance using countries 
worldwide that have introduced a gender quota with sanction as a quasi-natural experiment. 
Our statistical analysis shows that board members' characteristics significantly change after the 
implementation of the gender quota. The results of our empirical analysis provide evidence that 
gender quotas have a neutral impact on firm performance in the short term and in the longer 
term, independently of changes in directors’ age, education, nationality, experience or 
independence. Our findings provide evidence that policymakers can use mandatory quotas to 
force firms to achieve gender balance on corporate boards without a negative impact on firm 
performance. Our results also suggest that policymakers create unrealistic expectations for 
women to boost firm performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Gender imbalance in corporate boards remains an undeniable fact for a large number of 
companies worldwide, despite significant advances for women in education, labor force and 
political participation across the globe. Women only represented 11.9% of boards of directors 
in European companies in 2010, dropping to 9.9% in the Americas, 6.5% in the Asia-Pacific 
Region and 3.2% in the Middle East and North Africa (Corporate Women Directors 
International, 2010). Policymakers have responded in many countries by imposing gender 
quotas for corporate boards partly for ethical principles and social justice, but also justifying 
this intervention by the positive economic effects expected from gender balance, in particular 
on firm profits. However, some critics of board reforms argue that mandatory rules could be 
unnecessary and potentially harmful if existing board practices reflect the optimal choice of 
firms after considering all factors. The average effect of gender quotas on firm performance is, 
therefore, an empirical question. Existing research focuses on a single country and yields mixed 
results. We extend this research by comparing the effect of gender quotas across all countries 
that imposed gender quotas with sanctions using a staggered difference-in-differences 
approach. We aim to reconcile the mixed findings in prior single-country studies and answer 
questions that the current literature is unable to address. Do firm values and profitability 
increase or decrease as a result of the new board structure imposed by the law in both the short 
and the long term? Could mandatory quotas be used to force firms to achieve gender balance 
without a negative impact on firm performance? Should policymakers realistically expect 
female directors to boost firm performance? 
 The literature analyzing the relationship between female directors and firm performance 
outside the context of gender quotas proposes numerous arguments to explain why the presence 
of women on boards should positively affect organizational outcomes. They include: (i) 
influence on decision making with women adopting more ethical, risk-averse and long-term 
oriented points of view (Rosener, 1990); (ii) women directors bringing resources and strategic 
input that male directors are not able to provide (Bilimoria, 2000); (iii) increased diversity of 
opinions in the boardroom (Francoeur et al. 2008); (iv) women directors improving monitoring 
of managers if they are more independent than their male counterparts, by not being part of  
“old boys’ networks” (Higgs, 2003; Post and Byron, 2015; Adams, 2016); and (v) signalling 
the stakeholders and the market that a company places a high value on women (Burgess and 
Tharenou, 2002; Kirsch, 2018). All these arguments support the “business case” argument that 
firms with more women on boards should perform better. The empirical literature analyzing the 
relationship between female directors and firm performance (see Kirsch, 2018 and Adams, 2016 
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for a survey) does not, however, provide clear evidence that women improve firm performance; 
some studies find that the presence of female directors has positive consequences on 
performance (e.g. Ryan and Haslam, 2005), while others find no differences in performance 
(e.g. Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Chapple and Humphrey, 2014) or even a negative impact of 
gender diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Lee and James, 2007). These mixed results could 
be explained by the argument provided by Adams (2016) that board diversity could positively 
affect firm performance only if female directors are different from their male counterparts.  
There is a large amount of literature analyzing gender differences in preferences for the 
general population. These studies provide evidence that women tend to be more averse to risk 
(see the surveys of Byrnes et al. 1999, and Croson and Gneezy, 2009), more long-term oriented 
(e.g. Silverman, 2003), more altruistic (e.g. Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001), have less of a taste 
for competition (e.g. Niederle, 2014), and are more ethical in their decisions (e.g. Ambrose and 
Schminke, 1999) than are men. However, it may be a fact that particular gender differences 
exist in the general population, it is less obvious whether these differences apply to corporate 
directors (Adams, 2016; Sila et al. 2016; Kirsch, 2018). Some studies show that women 
reaching the top of the corporate ladder are different from those in the general population. 
Deaves et al. (2009), who conduct experiments on a group of economics, finance and business 
students, do not find differences between women’s and men’s preferences and postulate that 
women may have a lot in common with men in comparable positions. It is, therefore, possible 
that women directors are different in their preferences from women in the general population, 
presenting characteristics that have helped them to access top positions in the corporate world. 
Adams and Funk (2012) support this argument by showing that female directors in Sweden are 
more risk-loving, less security- and tradition-oriented, and more self-direction- and stimulation-
oriented than male directors, while the opposite holds for women in the general population. The 
literature further documents that female directors are different in their skills, age, and 
experience. They tend to have higher levels of education, with a higher percentage of female 
directors holding MBA and Ph.D. degrees compared to their male peers, and they have 
substantially more international experience (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; Singh et al. 2008). It 
also appears that female directors tend to be younger than their male colleagues (e.g. Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Adams & Funk, 2012; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012), and may bring new ideas and 
strategies (Burke, 1994; Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1994). Adams (2016) argues that some of these 
differences between female and male directors are likely to vanish over time; if the impact of 
gender diversity on firm outcomes derives only from these differences, it would be then hard to 
observe a significant impact in the long run.  
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 Most policy-makers appeal to the “business case” argument to justify the imposition of 
quotas even if there is no clear empirical evidence that women’s presence on boards improves 
firm performance, ignoring the fact that female directors might not have performance-
enhancing powers by virtue of their gender. Policymakers also neglect counter-arguments on 
the desirability and efficacy of gender quotas. The first argument used to question the 
imposition of gender quotas refers to the contract theory of the firm, supposing that firms 
maximize profits prior to the imposition of quotas. As the introduction of a gender quota forces 
firms to modify their decision regarding the share of women on the board, it might reduce firm 
profits if they were already at a point where profits were maximized (Pande and Ford, 2011; 
Gopalan and Watson, 2015). Another argument against quotas is based on studies explaining 
that under-representation of women on boards is not due to discrimination but the result of 
women’s choices, mainly for fertility and motherhood reasons (Burke, 1994; Bertrand et al. 
2010; Miller, 2011). In this context, if there are not enough women with the appropriate 
qualifications that will accept being appointed, gender quotas might promote less-qualified 
individuals who might perform poorly, and this could result in firms’ decreased profits. Another 
critique of gender quotas is the risk of entrenchment of female directors if they feel secure in 
their position; they might then have less pressure than their male counterparts to represent 
shareholders' interest (Coate and Loury 1993; Matsa and Miller 2013). It is also plausible that 
gender diversity would exacerbate conflicts and make consensus more difficult to be attained, 
and this can result in more erratic outcomes (Arrow, 1951; Bernile et al., 2018). Business ethics 
arguments are furthermore used to question gender quotas, as these could be undemocratic 
(Dubbink, 2005) and discriminatory (Gopalan & Watson, 2015). Quotas are then justified as a 
rational “last response” to the problem of gender imbalance on corporate boards. 
 The effect of gender quotas on firm performance is still an open debate. This paper uses the 
adoption of gender quotas with sanctions in several countries as a quasi-natural experiment to 
determine whether promoting women on boards through mandatory rules has an influence on 
boards characteristics (age, education, experience, nationality, independency, etc) and how 
these changes influence the way gender quotas impact firm performance. To obtain a clear 
picture we examine the impact of gender quotas on market valuation and operating profits. 
While policymakers expect positive effects from the imposition of gender quotas, they can also 
create unrealistic expectations for women. We should only expect gender quotas to improve 
firm performance if male and female directors are different other than in their gender and if the 
cost to be paid when including gender balance through mandatory rules is not too high. 
Moreover, as firms have usually several years to comply with the gender quotas, potential 
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changes in performance could materialize several years after the reforms have become 
effective. We address this issue of timing and duration of the gender quotas effect by analyzing 
the changes in performance in the years following the introduction of the laws as well as the 
cumulative effect over longer time windows. We furthermore investigate whether the impact of 
board gender quotas can manifest through different channels (changes in board members’ 
characteristics, distance from compliance, corporate decisions, critical mass, size and level of 
performance of the firm).  
 Despite the importance of understanding the desirability of mandatory rules to address 
women's under-representation on boards, there is limited empirical research on gender quotas 
in the field of corporate governance, with a focus on Norway that was the first country to impose 
a gender quota. A first-of-its-kind law was passed in 2003 requiring Norwegian listed firms to 
have at least 40% of women on boards of directors by July 2005. The law became compulsory 
in 2006 after voluntary compliance failed. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find that the constraint 
imposed by the quota caused a significant decrease in the stock price at the announcement of 
the first-of-its-kind law in 2003 and a decrease in Tobin’s Q over the following years, using 
instrumental variables estimations to deal with endogeneity issues.2 Matsa and Miller (2013), 
using a difference-in-differences method, further find that short-run operating profit declined 
after the compulsory law of 2006 because of increased labor costs and higher relative 
employment. Yang et al. (2019), using the same approach than Matsa and Miller (2013), find a 
negative effect of gender quota on firm performance and on firm risk. On the contrary, Eckbo 
et al. (2018), using the same IV analysis as Ahern and Dittmar (2012), find that there is no 
change in operating profitability following quota compliance after extending the sample period 
beyond the recent financial crisis. They furthermore show that quota-induced changes in market 
valuation were economically and statistically insignificant.  
 Our paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, we extend the literature 
that investigates the link between gender quotas and firm performance by providing the first 
study that examines this for a cross-country sample. We also contribute to the literature by 
examining not only the short term effect of gender quotas on firm performance as in the existing 
literature but also the longer-term effect. Our results relate to the policy debate concerning the 
increasing tendency of national legislatures to introduce boardroom gender quotas. Second, our 
paper contributes to the literature on the inconclusive debate over board gender diversity and 
firm performance. We focus for that on a country-level shock that can be considered as quasi-
 
2 The instrument used is the firm’s percentage of female directors in 2002 interacted with year dummies.  
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natural experiments. While board reforms are not necessarily exogenous in terms of timing or 
origin, they are exogenous to the individual firms within a country as these firms are affected 
disregarding shareholders’ intention (Fauver et al., 2017). Gender quotas, therefore, provide an 
identification strategy that alleviates the endogeneity issues present when examining the 
correlation between the presence of female directors and firm performance. Third, we 
contribute more generally to the economic literature that aims to understand what happens when 
public policies help women overcome existing barriers to professional advancement and occupy 
positions at the top of the corporate ladder. We, therefore, expand on previous research 
analyzing the impact of gender quotas on political positions (see Pande and Ford, 2011 for a 
survey).  
 To conduct our empirical analysis, we consider, at the worldwide level, which countries have 
adopted a law to impose a gender quota at least to listed firms and state-owned firms between 
2003 and 2018, and with sanctions in the case of non-compliance. We limit our analysis to 
countries that impose gender quotas with sanctions as we observe otherwise that the presence 
of women on boards remains very limited, far below the quota. Because the gender quotas are 
adopted at different points in time, we use a staggered difference-in-differences (DID) research 
design to estimate the impact of the reforms on firm performance. Our results show that gender 
quotas have a neutral impact on firm performance in the short term and in the longer term. Our 
results further show that this neutral effect holds after taking into account changes in directors’ 
age, education, nationality, experience or independence, and also if we consider a critical mass 
effect, the distance to the compliance, and the size and the level of performance of the firm. 
Our findings, therefore, provide evidence that policymakers can use mandatory quotas to 
promote and increase gender balance on the boards of companies without a negative impact on 
firm performance either in the short term or in the longer term. These results also provide 
evidence that an exogenous increase in the number of female directors does not lead to an 
increase in firm performance, as expected by policymakers. Female directors do not seem to be 
“superheroes” (in reference to Adams, 2016) having the power to increase performance just by 
virtue of their gender. Our results are robust to various sensitivity analyses, such as the use of 
alternative DID methodologies, pseudo reform years during the pre- and post-reform period 
separately, and alternative samples.  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers background on board 
gender quotas; Section 3 presents our sample and a descriptive analysis on changes in boards’ 
compositions and board members’ characteristics after gender quotas; Section 4 describes our 
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empirical methodology, presents the results and carries out several robustness checks; Section 
5 provides additional investigations, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background on board gender quotas  
The primary function of the board of directors is to hire and fire executives, and to advise 
them. The board is ultimately responsible for ensuring firms create value for shareholders. An 
important question is therefore what makes boards effective. For many years, independent 
directors have been seen as the “magical” solution to answer this question and solve many 
corporate governance problems (Adams, 2016). However, the empirical research does not 
support the high expectations that policymakers have put on the value of board independence 
(see De Haan and Vlahu, 2016 for a discussion). Following the “business case” argument, 
policymakers thought that the presence of women on boards is an alternative solution to 
ameliorate corporate governance and improves decision-making processes within firms 
(Adams, 2016). Despite significant advances in education and political participation, women 
remain relatively underrepresented on boards. Policymakers in many countries have therefore 
decided to take measures to promote and increase gender balance on the boards of firms, 
through either legislative measures that set quotas or voluntary initiatives.  
Norway was the first country to impose a gender quota in 2006, with sanctions in the case 
of non-compliance. From 2008 it obliged listed companies to have women in at least 40% of 
board seats. Over the next years more than twenty countries, mostly western European, adopted 
gender quotas, however with important differences with respect to the firms in question (state-
owned firms only and/or publicly listed firms), the threshold (30 to 50%), deadlines for 
compliance (1 to 8 years) and sanctions (from no sanction to warnings, fines, the suspension of 
benefits for directors, the nullification of board elections, etc) (see Table 1). Some other 
countries refuse to implement mandatory rules to support board diversity as the desirability and 
efficacy of such affirmative action is discussed controversially, and instead introduce voluntary-
based measures through governance code amendments (Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and 
the UK), or disclosure requirements (Australia, Denmark, New Zealand and the USA3) (Adams, 
2016; Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015). In Europe, a voluntary process for companies was 
 
3 The only exception in the USA is California that mandated in October 2018 that publicly listed firms 
headquartered in California include at least one woman on their boards by the end of 2019, at least two women for 
boards with five members and at least three women on boards with six or more members by the end of July 2021. 
Firms that fail to comply will face significant fines. Greene et al. (2020) find that the introduction of this quota is 
associated with a drop in firm stock prices at the announcement date. This result is confirmed by Hwang et al. 
(2019) and Meyerinck et al. (2019).  
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proposed in 2012 by the European Commission to reach the goal of 30% women board 
members by the year 2015 and 40% by 2020 (European Commission, 2012).  
 Cross-country studies show that legal mandates have been more potent than voluntary-based 
measures to increase women’s representation on boards (The European Union Progress Report, 
Gender balance in decision-making positions, 2012). Voluntary initiatives do not generally 
allow a critical mass of female directors on boards to be achieved, as in the United States where 
the number of women has remained stagnant over the period 2012-2016 with on average 2.1 
women per board (Global Board Diversity Analysis, Egon Zehnder, 2016). The theoretical 
literature demonstrates that if the number of women on a board is too small, problems of 
tokenism arise (hypervisibility, stereotyping, exclusion), resulting in a negative impact on 
organizational outcomes (Kanter, 1977). Konrad et al. (2008) argue that the critical mass of 
women to have a positive effect on organizational outcomes is three directors (around 30%). 
Torchia et al. (2011), in line with this argument, find for a panel of Norwegian firms that female 
directors contribute to increase the level of firm innovation when the critical mass of at least 
three female directors is reached.  
 The limited presence of female directors in many countries leads to a consideration of 
whether and how public policy should respond. We need to understand the benefits and costs 
of enabling women to become directors to answer these questions. One way to obtain such an 
understanding is to evaluate the impact of direct policy interventions such as gender quotas. 
While the literature on the effects of gender quotas in the context of business and/or politics is 
vast (see Profeta et al., 2014 and Pande and Ford, 2011 for reviews), the literature examining 
the impact of board gender quotas on firm outcomes is scarce to date and only concerns the 
Norwegian case. Matsa and Miller (2013), Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and Yang et al. (2019) 
investigate how the implementation of a gender quota of at least 40% impacted the performance 
of Norwegian firms over the period 2003-2009. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find that the 
announcement of the quota caused negative market reactions, and Yang et al. (2019) and Matsa 
and Miller (2013) report a decline in operating profit, caused by an increase in labor costs and 
employment level. Bertrand et al. (2019) further find that the gender gap in earnings within 
boards fell substantially after the reform, but they do not find robust evidence that the quota 
benefited the larger set of women employed in these companies. Bøhren and Staubo (2014) also 
provide evidence that mandatory gender balance produces firms with inefficient organizational 
forms and suboptimal board composition. These studies conclude therefore that profitability 
fell after women were brought onto corporate boards because of a quota, in line with the 
argument that regulations forcing firms to do things they currently do not are likely to impose 
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some costs. Bøhren and Staubo (2014) further find that the imposition of a gender quota in 
Norway reduced firm value through an increase in board independence.4 However, Nygaard 
(2011) shows that this effect depends on asymmetric information between independent 
members of the boards and the companies’ managers. Eckbo et al. (2018), who extend their 
sample beyond the financial crisis of 2007-2008, find that Norwegian firm market values and 
operating profitability did not decline after quota compliance. They show that the decline in 
performance reported by previous studies appears to be a phenomenon limited to the financial 
crisis years.  
 The question of whether gender quotas have a positive, negative or neutral impact on firm 
outcomes has not therefore been extensively studied and remains unclear despite its importance 
for policymakers. To characterize the influence of board gender quotas on firm performance, 
we need a better understanding of the differences between female and male directors, and how 
diversity affects firm performance not only in the short term but also in the longer term. If 
differences exist between female and male directors, then it is possible that increasing board 
diversity may impact boards’ decision-making and then firms’ outcomes, but it also depends 
on the costs induced by the imposition of mandatory rules. We examine in this paper whether 
board gender quotas have a meaningful impact on boards and firm performance for countries 
that have implemented gender quotas with sanctions.  
[Insert Table 1] 
 
3. Data and summary statistics on boards of directors 
 3.1. Presentation of the sample 
 Our study focuses on the group of countries at the world level which has adopted a gender 
quota with sanctions for publicly listed firms and state-owned firms (SOEs) over the period 
2003-2018 (see Table 1 for details). We exclude countries that have adopted a gender quota 
without sanctions because we find that the percentage of women on boards of directors remains 
far below the quota even after the date of compliance, showing the important role of sanctions 
to force firms to comply with gender quotas. We furthermore do not include countries that have 
adopted a gender quota with sanctions but without imposing a certain threshold (e.g. India that 
 
4 Bøhren and Staubo (2016) justify their results with the findings of both the existing theoretical literature (Adams 
and Ferreira 2007) and empirical literature (Linck et al. 2008; Duchin et al. 2010) showing that optimal board 
independence requires a trade-off between the value of advice provided by inside directors and the value of 
monitoring provided by independent directors. The imposition of a gender quota could increase the number of 
independent directors above its optimal level. 
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only imposes having one female director, and Denmark that lets firms set their own threshold). 
We are left with a panel of Belgian, French, German, Italian and Norwegian firms.  
 A gender quota with sanctions was implemented in Belgium, France Germany, Italy, and 
Norway, with differences in the threshold considered, the date of compliance and the type of 
sanction (see Table 1). Norway was the first country in the world to impose a gender quota in 
2003 on a voluntary basis, and then made mandatory in 2006. The law requires that SOEs and 
listed firms achieve 40 percent board representation by women, and firms that did not comply 
by January 2008 would be forced to dissolve. In Belgium, the law requires SOEs and listed 
companies to have at least one third (33%) representation from each sex on their board. The 
date of compliance is 2012 for SOEs, 2017 for listed companies and 2019 for listed SMEs. In 
cases of non-compliance, board members would lose financial and non-financial benefits until 
compliance with the law. In France, the law requires listed companies and SOEs to include 40% 
of women on their board by 2017, with an intermediate target of 20% by 2014. The penalty for 
non-compliant companies is the annulment of board appointments. In Italy, the law imposes a 
gender quota of 33% for listed companies and SOEs by 2015, with financial sanctions for non-
compliant companies. In Germany, a law enshrines a 30% minimum quota of women on the 
board of directors for the 110 biggest listed companies by 2016. In case of non-compliance, the 
seats on the board will remain empty or the firm might face administrative fines.  
 We collect board of directors’ information for Belgian, French, German, Italian and 
Norwegian firms listed on the stock market from the BoardEx database over the period 2003 to 
2018 (see Table 3 for the number of firms per country and per year). We follow the existing 
literature and exclude financial institutions as they are subject to specific regulation (see 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Matsa and Miller, 2013 or Bennouri 
et al., 2018). For Germany, we select for each year the 110 biggest listed firms based on their 
total assets; after excluding financial institutions, we are left with 70 German firms in our 
sample in 2018 (see Table 3).  
 Consolidated financial statements and market-based indicators are extracted from the 
database Bloomberg. Financial variables are winsorized at the one percent tails, as it is common 
when working with accounting data. 
 
 3.2. How boards of directors change 
 We examine in this section how the imposition of a gender quota with sanction changes 
board composition and individual board members’ characteristics. Given the large demand 
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shock imposed by the quota, we expect board composition and characteristics to be different 
along many dimensions; we, therefore, use a large set of indicators, all defined in Table 2.  
 Table 3 compares for each country considered the board gender composition of firms before 
and after the imposition of the quota. Firms were on average far from the minimum number of 
women imposed by the quota before the law. As expected, the percentage of female directors 
increases after the introduction of the quota. Interestingly, we find that the average board size 
remains mostly constant over the period in the five countries, indicating that firms replace male 
directors with female directors to comply with the law. We also observe from Table 3 that the 
percentage of female directors is on average below the legal quota at the date of compliance in 
Belgium (26%), France (35%), Germany (22%), Italy (26%) and Norway (37%); this could be 
explained by the relatively high number of firms that do not respect the quota (around 63% in 
Belgium, 49% in France, 73% in Germany, 77% in Italy, and 43% in Norway). However, we 
can see that in Norway and Italy the number of firms that do not comply with the law strongly 
decreases three years after the date of compliance, suggesting that the sanctions potentially 
applied were effective to prompt a large number of firms to respect the quota.  
 We next analyze whether compliance with gender quotas modifies other observable 
characteristics of firm board members, such as age, education, experience, and independence. 
As we find similar results for Belgian, French, German, Italian and Norwegian firms, we only 
report in Tables 4 to 6 the average statistics for all firms together.5 Table 4 shows, in line with 
the existing literature, that female directors are younger than their male colleagues, and this 
holds before and after the imposition of a gender quota. Female board members are on average 
about five years younger than males after the quota. As we might expect, the time on boards of 
female directors (around 4 years) is shorter than male directors (around 7 years) after the 
introduction of gender quotas, indicating that new females are recruited with a shorter tenure 
than male directors. A larger number of female directors is also recruited outside the firms after 
the imposition of the quota, as outlined by the shorter time spent in the company, around 5 years 
against more than 8 years for male directors. We also observe that the number of foreign female 
directors increases significantly after the gender quota, to become superior to the number of 
foreign male directors. Our statistics further show that the proportion of female directors who 
are independent strongly increased after the quotas, to the point of becoming larger than the 
proportion of independent male directors.  
 
5 Statistics by country are available on request.  
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 Table 5 further presents information on education and board experience of directors. In Table 
6, we split our board members into retained, exiting, and new members and report data on 
education and board experience for each group before and after quotas. Tables 5 and 6 show 
that female directors are more highly educated than their male colleagues, with a stronger 
difference after the quota. This finding does not support the argument that the binding constraint 
imposed by the quota forces firms to hire less qualified women. Interestingly, we also find that 
there are more men with higher education than before the law. These findings support the idea 
that gender quotas may encourage a better selection mechanism, mainly by increasing the level 
of education of the entire board. We also find that female directors have significantly less 
experience on boards, have significantly less CEO experience and are less likely to be chairman 
compared to male directors and these differences hold for both retained and new female 
directors. However, we observe that women have the same opportunity to be vice-chairman or 
vice-CEO than male directors after the quotas. We furthermore do not find that women serve 
on more boards after the introduction of quotas. These findings show that gender quotas give 
opportunities to a large number of women to serve on boards, and do not force firms to appoint 
the same few women with the risk of reducing the quality of corporate governance. These 
findings also provide evidence that the primary constraint on female directors is not the lack of 
interest in such positions by women.  
 Overall, our analysis shows that gender quotas have altered, as expected, the gender 
composition of boards but also other board members’ characteristics, such as age, nationality, 
education, board experience, and independency. We will explore, in the next section, whether 
the imposition of a board gender quota has an impact on firm performance and whether this 
impact depends on the changes we observed in board members’ characteristics. 
[Insert Tables 2 to 6] 
 
4. How gender quotas affect firm performance 
 4.1. Methodology 
The DID baseline specification  
 We use a DID model with a staggered adoption system since it accounts for the gender quotas 
staggered over time. This methodology is consistent with studies having staggered treatment 
events (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Fauver et al. 2017; Jiang et al. 2019). The treated 
group is listed firms that are affected by a gender quota. This approach implicitly considers in 
the control group all listed firms located in a country without reforms at time t, even if it will 
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have a reform in the future.6 We, therefore, compare changes in firm performance following 
the adoption of a gender quota with changes in firm performance in countries without gender 
quotas during the same year. By doing so, we aim to separate the effect of gender quotas from 
other factors potentially affecting firm performance.  
 We consider three measures of performance, based on both accounting and market-based 
measures of performance, as they are not perfect measures of firm performance when it comes 
to analyzing the outcome of board changes (Kirsch, 2018; Bennouri et al., 2018). We consider 
the most common market-based measure of performance, the Tobin’s Q (Tobin Q), defined as 
the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided 
by the book value of assets. Market-based measures incorporate investor perceptions and they 
might be influenced by sexism and stereotype beliefs about women's suitability for directorship. 
Such measures might then capture the market’s reaction to the quota rather than changes in 
board performance. We therefore also consider two accounting-based measures, the return on 
assets (ROA), computed as the ratio of net income over total assets, and the operating profit 
(Operating Profit), calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes over total assets.  
However, accounting-based measures are sensitive to any discretionary behavior such as 
earnings management.  
 We first use the following specification to compare changes in performance between treated 
and non-treated firms, before and after the imposition of quota: 
𝑌௜௝௧ = 𝛽 ൅  𝛽ଵ𝐷𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎௝௧ ൅ ∑ 𝛽௠𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙௜௝௧ ൅ ∑ 𝛽௡𝐹𝐸௜௧ +  𝜀௜௝௧ (1)
where the subscript i denotes firm, j denotes country, t denotes the time period, and 𝜀௜௝௧ is the 
idiosyncratic error term. 𝑌௜௝௧, the dependent variable, is either Tobin Q, ROA or Operating 
Profits. 𝐷𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎௝௧  is a dummy variable taking the value of one when the gender quota is 
introduced in country j and thereafter, and zero otherwise. We include a full set of firm fixed 
effects and time fixed effects. The firm and year fixed effects take into account the within-firm 
and within-year change in firm performance between treated and non-treated firms when 
countries impose gender quotas. We also cluster the standard errors at the firm level to allow 
for serial dependence in the error correlation structure within firms.  
 Our coefficient of interest in this regression is 𝛽ଵ. It assesses the impact of the 
implementation of gender quotas on the performance of treated firms. We mitigate the 
correlated omitted variable problem by including in our specification a set of time-varying, 
 
6 We alternatively consider in the control group firms located in European countries that did not implement a 
gender quota (see Section 4.4.).  
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firm-level and country-level variables commonly used in the existing literature to explain firm 
performance: the firm size (Firm size), the growth of sales (Sales growth), the level of capital 
(Leverage), the ratio of cash divided by total assets (Cash), the ratio of property, plant, and 
equipment divided by total sales (PPE), and the growth of GDP (GDP). The detailed definition 
and calculation of these variables are given in Table 2.  
 
The DID specification to differentiate the short and long term effects  
 As it could take several years for firms to comply with the gender quota, the expected impact 
on their performance might be different in the years directly following the reform, and years 
further in the future. To address this concern, we replace the dummy variable DQuota in our 
DID specification (1) with two timing dummies that track the short and long term effects of the 
gender quota. More specifically, we test whether there is a significant change in firm 
performance in the three years following the gender quota including the year the reform 
becomes effective (DQuota[0, +2]), and from the fourth year after the imposition of the gender 
quota onward (DQuota[+3, T]). T denotes the end of the sample period.  
 
The role of board characteristics 
We next examine whether the impact of gender quotas is not driven by changes in board 
members’ characteristics other than gender. To address this concern, we augment the Equation 
(1) with an interaction term between the dummy variable DQuota (or DQuota[0, +2] and 
DQuota[+3, T]) and one of the dummy variables that depict changes in board members’ 
characteristics after gender quotas. The analysis of board members’ characteristics conducted 
in Section 3.2 shows that compliance with the gender quota forced firms to appoint a higher 
proportion of directors who are younger, come from foreign countries, have postgraduate 
degrees, have less experience on boards, and are more independent. We, therefore, consider the 
five following alternative dummy variables: (1) dLowAge takes the value of one if the average 
age of directors of a board is below the median value of the group; (2) dHighForeign takes the 
value of one if the average percentage of foreign directors of a board is above the median value 
of the group; (3) dHighEducation takes the value of one if the percentage of directors of a board 
having postgraduate degrees is above the median of the group; (4) dLowExperience if the 
percentage of directors having experience as CEO or Chairman of a board is below the median 
of the group; and (5) dHighIndependent if the percentage of  independent directors is above the 
median of the group. Our coefficient of interest in this regression is the coefficient for the 
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interaction variable that shows how changes in board members’ characteristics influence the 
way gender quotas impact firm performance.     
 
 4.2. Results 
 Table 7 reports the estimation results of Equation (1) where the performance is measured by 
either the Tobin’s Q, the ROA or the operating profit. Model (1) is the baseline model where 
the effect of the gender quota is captured for the entire period following the reform by the 
coefficient of the dummy variable DQuota. Model (2) disentangles the short and the long term 
effects of the imposition of a gender quota with the two dummy variables DQuota[0, +2] and 
DQuota[+3, T]. We include in both models firm and year fixed effects, and standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level.  
 Our results show that none of the considered performance measures are significantly affected 
by the imposition of a gender quota. We observe these results when we consider the effect of 
the imposition of a gender quota on the entire period after the reform (Model (1)), as well as 
for the short and the longer periods (Model (2)). This neutral effect of board gender quotas on 
firm performance provide evidence that the costs associated with the imposition of gender 
quotas on boards are not too high and do not induce a negative impact on firm profits. Our 
findings are not therefore consistent with the previous work of Ahern and Dittmar (2012), Matsa 
and Miller (2013) and Yang et al. (2019) that the enforcement of a gender quota in Norway 
caused a decline in firm outcomes. We instead find that gender quotas have a neutral effect on 
firm performance, in line with the recent work of Eckbo et al. (2018).  
 We next examine whether the impact of gender quotas becomes significant when we 
consider the influence of changes in board members’ characteristics other than gender. We 
report the estimation results in Table 8 using firm and year fixed effects and standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. Panels A, B, C, D and E report the results when allowing for 
differential effects for treated firms when they have, respectively, a higher proportion of 
younger board members, a higher proportion of foreign directors, a higher proportion of 
directors with postgraduate degrees, a lower proportion of directors with more board 
experience, and a higher proportion of independent directors. We find that none of these 
changes in board members’ characteristics impact the way gender quotas influence firm 
performance on the entire period after the reform (Model (1)), and for the short and the longer 
periods (Model (2)).  
 Overall, our empirical results show that the introduction of gender quotas has a neutral 
impact on firm performance both in the short and the long term, and that changes in directors’ 
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age, education, nationality, experience or independency have no impact on the quota’s effect. 
Our findings support the argument that policymakers can force firms to achieve a gender-
balanced representation on corporate boards through a mandatory quota without generating 
negative effects on their performance in the short and long term. Moreover, our findings do not 
support the expectations of policymakers that female directors can increase firm performance 
in the short term or in the long term, showing that policymakers might create unrealistic 
expectations for female directors.  
[Insert Tables 7 to 8] 
 
 4.4. Robustness checks 
We carry out several robustness checks in order to verify the neutrality of the relationship 
between board gender quotas and firm performance.   
Parallel trend assumption  
 The parallel trend assumption underlying our DID design supposes that, in the absence of 
treatment, the average change in firm performance would have been the same for the treated 
and the control groups. We follow Fauver et al. (2017) and assess this assumption by conducting 
two placebo tests. The first test limits the analysis to the pre-reform periods and applies the 
pseudo reform effective year as three years prior to the actual reform year. The second placebo 
test we realized considers the post-reform periods, with the pseudo reform year fixed as three 
years after the actual reform year. The results of these two placebo tests are reported in Table 
A1 in the Appendix. We observe no evidence of significant changes in firm performance 
subsequent to the two pseudo reform years we considered. These results suggest that, in the 
absence of treatment, our treatment and control groups display a similar trend in performance.   
 
Alternative DID specification 
 We first use an alternative DID design where we consider as control group listed firms from 
other European countries that are not affected by a gender quota (Austria, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Switzerland). As these firms are from other Western European 
countries, they are geographically and culturally close to the group of treated firms, and they 
also have comparable business development and operate in analogous macroeconomic 
conditions. We remove countries that have enforced gender quota legislation for listed firms 
without sanctions or with no threshold (Denmark, The Netherlands, and Spain) or just made 
recommendations (Sweden and The United Kingdom). We also exclude Finland from the 
control group because the percentage of female directors in this country is relatively high.  
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 The validity of this difference-in-differences approach requires that control firms have 
similar characteristics to treated firms during the pre-treatment period. This implies that our 
dependent variables must follow a parallel trend over time for the two groups of treated and 
non-treated firms. If it is not the case, the estimates might be biased by structural differences 
between these two groups of firms. We, therefore, test for each dependent variable if there is a 
significant parallel trend between treated and control firms over the pre-treatment period, using 
mean tests (see Table A2, Panel A, in the Appendix). We find that there is no difference in 
ROA, Tobin Q and Operating Profit between the two groups of firms before the reform. These 
results, therefore, indicate that the parallel trends of our dependent variables before the 
treatment period are validated.  
 Our difference-in-differences regression is the following, with the pseudo reform year to the 
control group based on the reform year of the treated group:  
𝑌௜௝௧ = 𝛼 ൅ 𝛼ଵ𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑௜௝ ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡௝௧  ൅  𝛼ଶ𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡௝௧ ൅ ∑ 𝛼௠𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙௜௝௧ ൅  ∑ 𝛼௡𝐹𝐸௜௧ ൅  𝜀௜௝௧  (2) 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑௜௝ is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the treated firms and zero 
for firms in the control group, and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡௧ is a dummy variable that equals one in the post-
treatment period, and zero in the pre-treatment period. The coefficient 𝛼ଵ assesses the impact 
of the adoption of a gender quota on the performance of treated firms. We consider the same 
set of control variables as in Equation (1). We introduce firm and year fixed effects, and 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. As we include firm fixed effects, we drop the variable 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑௝ as there is no within-variation of this variable. Panel B of Table A2 reports the 
regression results. We find that the coefficient associated with the interaction term  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑௜௝ ∗
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡௧ is not significant for the three performance measures we consider. These results are 
consistent with our previous results that the introduction of gender quotas has a neutral impact 
on firm performance.  
 We next define a new specification that allows us to capture the year-specific effect of a 
gender quota on firm performance. We replace in the Model (2) of Equation (1) the three years 
post-gender quota dummy variable DQuota[0, +2] by a set of three dummies (DQuota0, DQuota1, 
and DQuota2) that take the value of one for the year in which the gender quota becomes 
effective, first and second years after, respectively. We report the estimation results of this 
Model (3) in Table A3 in the Appendix, using the same methodology as in Models (1) and (2). 
The coefficient associated with each pre- and post-reform window dummies are not significant. 
The results of Model (3) therefore confirm the absence of a short-term and long-term effect of 
the introduction of a gender quota on firm performance.  
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 We furthermore cluster the standard errors at either the country level or the industry sector level7. 
These results confirm those we found previously with standard errors clustered at the firm level (see 
Table A4).   
 
Sub-sample analysis   
 We finish our robustness test analysis by presenting the results using three alternative samples. 
First, we exclude France from the initial sample as we have a relatively high number of firms in this 
country (see Table A5 Panel A in the Appendix). Second, we restrict our sample period to five years 
before and after the introduction of a gender quota to reduce the likelihood that our results will be 
affected by other effects than this reform (see Table A5, Panel B). Third, we use, as in Fauver et al. 
(2017), a restricted sample that requires a firm to appear at least one year in the pre-period and one 
year in the post-period (see Table A5, Panel C). We find that our conclusions are robust to changes 
in the initial sample, with a neutral impact of gender quotas on firm performance. 
 
5. Additional investigations  
 We now examine several additional factors that could also have an impact on the relationship 
between the imposition of a gender quota and firm performance. 
 
Compliance with the quota 
The statistical analysis conducted in Section 3.2 revealed that several firms do not respect 
the quota at the date of compliance (see Table 3). We examine whether the neutral effect of 
gender quotas on firm performance is driven by the large number of firms that do not comply 
with the law, with some firms still having a low percentage of female directors at the date of 
compliance (see Table 3). We create the dummy variable dComply taking the value of one if a 
firm has a percentage of female directors respecting the gender quota at the date of compliance. 
We estimate an expanded version of our Equation (1) for Models (1) and (2), using firm and 
year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the firm level. Results are reported in Table 
9 (Panel A); our results are unchanged and confirm that gender quotas have a neutral impact on 
firm performance both in the short and the long term. 
 We also have some firms that already have enough women on their boards before the 
treatment year to respect the threshold imposed by the mandatory quota (8 firms in Belgium, 
 
7 We use Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) provided by Bloomberg to classify industries into categories and 
group firms of similar nature together. 
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13 firms in France, 5 firms in Germany, 2 firms in Italy, and 14 firms in Norway). Our results 
remain unchanged if we exclude these firms from our sample (see Panel B in Table 9).     
 
Distance from compliance 
We next examine whether firms furthest from compliance at the date of the reform display 
a significant impact of gender quotas on their performance, as they were required to add a 
greater number of women to their boards before the deadline. In our sample, 25% of firms in 
Belgium and 28% in Italy had no women on their boards the year before the quota, while it is 
only around 15% of firms in France, 14% in Norway, and 7% in Germany. We create the 
dummy variable dDistCompliance that takes the value of one if a firm has no female director 
on its board the year before the implementation of the gender quota. Again, we estimate Models 
(1) and (2) of the Equation (1) to examine whether treated firms with no women on their boards 
before the law was adopted exhibited significant effects of gender quotas. Results, reported in 
Table 9 (Panel C), indicate that gender quotas have a neutral impact on firm performance in the 
entire period after the reform and in the short and longer period, independently of their distance 
from compliance.   
 
Corporate policies 
 We examine whether corporate decision-making changes after the quota. We follow Matsa 
and Miller (2012) by considering four variables to measure different dimensions of firm 
policies: the ratio of labor cost over total assets (Labor cost), the level of employment 
(Employment) calculated as the natural logarithm of number of workers in a firm, the ratio of 
other costs over total assets (Other costs), and the ratio of revenues over total assets (Revenues). 
Results are reported in Table 10 and show that the imposition of gender quotas does not 
significantly affect employment, labor or other costs, and revenues in the entire period, and in 
the short and longer periods. Our findings support the argument that the presence of women on 
boards does not affect corporate policy decisions, and therefore does not influence 
organizational outcomes, as highlighted in Table 7.  
 
Critical mass effect 
 As the critical mass theory suggests, there must be at least three women on a board before 
the women really make a difference, otherwise, they can still be considered as tokens. The 
statistical analysis we conducted in Section 3.2 shows that a large number of firms do not 
respect the quota, even after the date of compliance. Moreover, firms with a small number of 
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directors might also have less than three female directors even if they comply with the gender 
quota. We, therefore, have a large number of firms that have less than three female directors on 
their boards. We test the critical mass argument by estimating an expanded version of our 
Equation (1) for Models (1) and (2), where we include an interaction term between our dummy 
variables for the introduction of a gender quota and the dummy variable dCriticalMass taking 
the value of one for firms having more than three female directors. The results are reported in 
Table 11. The coefficient associated with the interaction term is positive and significant in 
Model (1) and in Model (2) for the longer-term effect (DQuota[+3, T]), but Wald tests are not 
significant. Our results, therefore, show that the total effect of the introduction of a gender quota 
on firm performance is insignificant, even if the number of female directors is above the critical 
mass.  
 
Firms’ characteristics 
We finally examine whether the neutral impact of gender quotas on firm performance is not 
driven by the size of the firm or the level of its performance. We create the two dummy variables 
dsize and dPerformance that take the value of one if the logarithm of sales or the ROA of a firm 
is above the median sample at the date of the implementation of the quota, respectively. Results, 
reported in Tables 12 and 13, indicate that gender quotas have a neutral impact on firm 
performance, independently of their size or their level of performance.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 Governments in many countries have adopted or are considering using mandatory rules to 
force firms to increase gender diversity on corporate boards. We exploit in this paper countries 
worldwide that have imposed a gender quota with sanction as a quasi-natural experiment to 
identify the impact of gender quotas on firm performance, to determine in particular if gender 
balance imposed through a mandatory rule is not associated with a negative impact on firm 
performance.  
 We first conduct a statistical analysis to examine how boards’ composition and board 
members’ characteristics are affected by the imposition of a gender quota with sanctions. As 
expected, we find that quotas are associated with a strong increase in female directors, with a 
board size that remains mostly constant over the period. Our statistics further show that board 
members’ characteristics significantly change after gender quotas, with higher education levels 
of all members, lower age, lower board experience, higher international exposure, and higher 
independence. Our findings also show that gender quotas do not force firms to appoint from 
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only a limited pool of women, providing evidence that the primary constraint of women to 
become a director is not the lack of interest in such positions. We also find that a large number 
of firms do not respect the quota at the date of compliance, but this number decreases in the 
following years when the sanctions are applied.  
 We next use a staggered difference-in-differences approach to explore how firm 
performance changes when the number of female directors is exogenously increased, both in 
the short and the long term. We expect gender quotas to have a positive impact on firm 
performance if male and female directors are different other than in their gender and if the cost 
associated with mandatory rules is not too high. Our results show that the introduction of gender 
quotas has a neutral impact on firm performance, both in the short term and in the longer term. 
Our results further show that directors’ age, education, nationality, experience or independence 
have no impact on the quota’s effect. Even if we find that female directors tend to be younger, 
to have higher levels of education, to have more international experience, and to be more 
independent than their male counterparts, these differences do not seem to have a significant 
impact on the way gender quotas influence firm performance. Our findings furthermore provide 
evidence that forcing radical gender balance on corporate boards through a mandatory quota 
does not adversely influence the performance of firms either in the short term or in the long 
term. Our results from a cross-country analysis challenge what we have learned from Ahern 
and Dittmar (2012), Matsa and Miller (2013) and Yang et al. (2019) on the Norwegian case, 
that gender quotas caused a decline in firm outcomes. Our findings are consistent with gender 
quotas inducing a neutral effect on firm performance, in line with the recent study of Eckbo et 
al. (2018) on Norwegian firms.  
 Overall, our study suggests that gender balance on corporate boards could be achieved by 
mandatory quotas without policymakers expecting negative effects for firm performance either 
in the short term or in the longer term. However, our study does not support the “business case” 
argument appealed by policymakers to justify the imposition of gender quotas, as we do not 
find that the presence of more women on boards is associated with an increase in firm 
performance. Policymakers can create unrealistic expectations for women as our study provides 
evidence that an increase in the number of female directors does not help to improve firm 
performance. Policymakers should instead rely on ethical principles and social justice to justify 
their decision to impose gender balance on the boards of companies. Our study also shows that 
a large number of firms do not respect the quota at the date of compliance, suggesting that 
strong sanctions need to be imposed to prompt firms to comply with the law.  
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Table 1. Countries with gender quotas on board of directors 
Country Quota PTFs SOEs Passage Date Compliance Date Sanctions 
Austria 35% No Yes 2011 Interim 25% by 2016; 2018: 35% None 
Belgium 33% Yes Yes June 30, 2011 
2012: SOEs;  
2017: PTFs 
2019: listed SMEs 
Void the appointment of any 
directors who do not conform to 
board quota targets; suspend director 
benefits 
Colombia 30% No Yes 2000 None None 
Denmark Own target Yes Yes Dec 12, 2012 April 1, 2013 Fines 
Finland 40% No Yes April 15, 2005 June 1, 2005 None 
France 40% Yes Yes Jan 13, 2011 Jan 1, 2014: 20%; Jan 1, 2017: 40%
The appointment is null and void; 
Fees will not be paid to directors
Germany 30% Yes No March 2015 2016: 110 biggest listed companies Director sear must be left vacant 
Greece 33% No Yes 2000 None None 
Greenland 
(Denmark) 50% Yes Yes 2013 Jan 2014 Not specified 
Iceland 40% Yes Yes March 4, 2010 Sep 1, 2013 None 
India 1 FBD Yes Yes August 2013 August 1, 2015 Fines 
Italy 33% Yes Yes June 28, 2011 Interim 20% by 2012; 2015 33% Fines; directors lose office 
Israel 1 FBD Yes No April 19, 1999 None None 
 50% No Yes March 11, 2007 2010 None 
Kenya 33% No Yes August 28, 2010 None None 
Malaysia 30% Yes No June 27, 2011 2016: 250+ employees None 
Netherlands 30% Yes No June 6, 2011 Jan 1, 2016 Explain in annual report 
Norway 40% Yes Yes Dec 19, 2003 2006: SOEs;  2008: PTFs
Refuse to register board; dissolve 
company; fines until compliance
Panama 30% No Yes 2017 Not specified Not specified 
Slovenia 40% No Yes 2004 Not specified None 
Spain 40% Yes No March 22, 2007 
March 1, 2015: 
PTFs with 250+ 
employees
None 
Taiwan 33% No Yes NA Not specified Not specified 
UAE 1 FBD Yes Yes Dec 2012 Not specified None 
Notes. Updated from Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorez (2016); PTFs: publicly traded firms; SOEs: state-owned enterprises; 
1 FBD: At least one female board director is required to be on the board. 
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Table 2. Variable definitions and data sources  
Variables  Definition Source 
Evolution of female directors on boards 
Board size Average number of board members BoardEx 
Female (%) -mean Average percentage of female directors on boards  BoardEx 
Female (%) – SD Standard deviation of percentage of female directors on boards BoardEx 
% Firms below quota Percentage of firms with a percentage of female directors below the legal quota 
BoardEx 
Board members characteristics 
Age Average age of directors  BoardEx 
Foreign (%) Percentage of foreign directors over the total number of directors BoardEx 
Tenure Average tenure of directors  BoardEx 
Time on Board Average time on board of directors in the company BoardEx 
Time in Company Average time in the company of directors, considering all board and non-board positions 
BoardEx 
Independent Percentage of independent directors over the total number of directors 
BoardEx 
Bachelor (%) Percentage of directors having as highest diploma a bachelor over the total number of directors  
BoardEx 
Postgraduate (%) Percentage of directors having a Master or a PhD degree over the total number of directors  
BoardEx 
Having board 
experience (%) 
Percentage of directors having experience on any board positions 
over the total number of directors  
BoardEx 
Number BOD to 
Date Average number of board positions of directors up to date  
BoardEx 
Number current 
BOD (Occupation) Average number of other current board positions of directors  
BoardEx 
CEO (%) Percentage of directors having experience as CEO over the total number of directors  
BoardEx 
Chairman (%) Percentage of directors having experience as Chairman over the total number of directors  
BoardEx 
Vice-Chairman /Vice 
President (%) 
Percentage of directors having experience as Vice Chairman or 
Vice President over the total number of directors  
BoardEx 
Dependent variables  
Tobin Q Book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by the book value of assets Bloomberg 
ROA Ratio of net income over total assets Bloomberg 
Operating Profits Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets 
Bloomberg 
Difference-in-differences variables  
DQuota Dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms when the gender quota is introduced and thereafter   
DQuota[0, +2] Dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms for the year of the gender quota is enacted and the two following years   
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DQuota[+3, T] Dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms from the fourth year after the imposition of the gender quota and onward  
DQuota0 Dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms for the year of the gender quota is enacted  
DQuota1 Dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms for one year after the quota  
DQuota2 Dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms for two years after the quota  
Control variables 
Firm size Natural logarithm of firm total assets Bloomberg 
Sales growth Annual growth rate of total sales Bloomberg 
Leverage Ratio of debt to total assets Bloomberg 
Cash Ratio of cash to total assets Bloomberg 
PPE Ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets Bloomberg 
GDP (%) GDP growth rate  World Bank 
Firm policies variables 
Revenue Ratio of revenues over total assets Bloomberg 
Labor Cost Ratio of labor cost over total assets Bloomberg 
Other Costs Ratio of other costs over total assets Bloomberg 
Employment Natural logarithm of the number of employees in a firm Bloomberg 
Dummy variables on board characteristics 
dLowAge Dummy variable taking the value of one if the average age of board members of a firm is below the median age of the group BoardEx 
dHighForeign 
Dummy variable taking the value of one if the average percentage 
of foreign directors on the board of a firm is above the median 
percentage of foreign directors of the group 
BoardEx 
dHighEducation 
Dummy variable taking the value of one if the average percentage 
of directors having a post-graduate degree on the board of a firm is 
above the median percentage of high qualified directors of the 
group 
BoardEx 
dLowExperience 
Dummy variable taking the value of one if the average percentage 
of directors having experience as CEO or Chairman on the board of 
a firm is below the median percentage of high position experienced 
directors of the group 
BoardEx 
dHighIndependent 
Dummy variable taking the value of one if the average percentage 
of independent directors on the board of a firm is above the median 
percentage of independent directors of the group 
BoardEx 
Other dummy variables (additionnal investigations) 
dComply 
Dummy variable taking the value of one if a firm has a percentage 
of female directors respecting the gender quota at the date of 
compliance (2008 for Norwegian firms, 2015 for Italian firms, 2016 
for German firms, 2017 for Belgian and French firms)  
BoardEx 
dDistCompliance 
Dummy variable taking the value of one if a firm has no female 
director on its board the year before quota (2005 for Norwegian 
firms, 2010 for Belgian, French and Italian firms, 2015 for German 
firms) 
BoardEx 
dCriticalMass Dummy variable taking the value of one if a firm has at least three women on its board at the date of compliance BoardEx 
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dSize 
Dummy variable taking the value of one if the logarithm of 
sales of a firm is above the median sample at the date of the 
implementation of the quota 
Bloomberg 
dPerformance 
Dummy variable taking the value of one if the ROA of a firm 
is above the median sample at the date of the implementation 
of the quota 
Bloomberg 
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Table 3. Statistics on the presence of women directors on boards by year 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
NORWAY (2006 – 2008 : 40%) 
Board size 7.70 7.38 7.32 7.33 7.08 7.36 7 7.08 7.25 7.15 7.26 7.05 7.02 6.97 6.74 6.73 
Female (%) -mean 12.10 14.95 20.80 26.43 36.51 37.23 35.92 38.82 40.62 39.37 39.23 39.28 40.66 40.58 41.21 41.25 
Female (%) - SD 12.43 12.58 14.22 15.45 13.03 10.58 12.14 10.24 9.41 9.13 9.58 6.86 8.27 7.11 8.31 8.72 
% Firms below quota 94.94 91.46 85 78.08 42.25 43.08 41.07 40.63 30.43 31.75 31.03 31.34 27.27 21.21 20.69 27.06 
Number of firms 79 82 80 73 71 65 56 64 69 63 58 67 66 66 87 85 
 
BELGIUM (2011-2017 : 33%) 
Board size 8.91 9.26 8.63 8.96 9.04 9.07 9 8.91 8.97 9.05 9.07 9.14 9.05 9.11 9.03 9.49 
Female (%) -mean 6.10 6.43 6.02 7.50 7.19 7.97 8.96 9.80 11.06 13.58 16.05 18.08 19.38 22.19 26.42 29.37 
Female (%) - SD 11.47 10.71 10.99 11.96 11.72 11.88 12.46 12.36 11.96 12.60 12.16 12.91 13 12.90 14.05 11.51 
% Firms below quota 94.34 96.30 94.44 92.16 92.59 91.23 89.47 89.47 91.38 91.07 90.91 87.50 79.45 75 62.86 57.14 
Number of firms 53 54 54 51 54 57 57 57 58 56 55 56 73 72 70 63 
 
FRANCE (2011-2017 : 40%) 
Board size 11.02 11.02 10.57 10.42 10.13 10.20 10.25 10.43 9.97 9.91 9.80 9.88 8.93 8.83 8.76 8.81 
Female (%) - mean 9.57 8.49 8.07 8.09 8.79 9.40 10.13 11.74 16.20 19.39 22.41 25.81 25.71 28.98 34.91 36.26 
Female (%) - SD 13.01 11.91 10.99 10.90 10.47 10.76 10.95 11.34 10.73 11.12 10.56 10.12 12.36 13.56 13.76 13.71 
% Firms below quota 95.09 95.43 94.88 94.64 95.47 95.06 95.85 94.21 94.49 92.81 91.47 87.63 83.05 71.69 49.65 44.76 
Number of firms 163 175 215 224 243 243 241 242 272 278 293 299 419 431 429 420 
 
ITALY (2011-2015 : 33%)
Board size 11.32 11.53 11.16 10.82 10.67 10.76 11.26 11.14 11.24 11.03 10.88 10.16 10.32 10.31 10.43 10.52 
Female (%) -mean 3.65 4.14 4.35 4.87 5.18 5.25 5.84 5.83 6.74 10.04 15.92 21 25.82 29.59 31.34 35.35 
Female (%) - SD 5.72 5.98 7.37 7.57 7.79 7.43 7.55 7.32 7.63 8.50 11.41 10.96 7.99 8.99 9.58 7.74 
% Firms below quota 100 100 98.04 100 98.55 100 100 100 100 98.53 92.75 84.38 77.32 52.04 38.78 18.56 
Number of firms 37 38 51 57 69 68 65 69 68 68 69 96 97 98 98 97 
 
GERMANY (2015-2016: 30%) 
Board size 18.32 17.68 17.45 17.57 16.19 16.23 16.38 15.44 15.90 16.07 15.80 16.02 15.90 16.28 15.90 15.59 
Female (%) -mean 6.23 6.45 6.58 6.63 7.22 5.62 6.09 7.23 9.12 12.69 13.84 14.84 17.08 22.16 22.58 24.30 
Female (%) - SD 8.51 8.30 8.02 8.88 8.95 6.34 6.12 7.21 7.67 9.64 9.70 8.84 9.30 10.32 10.96 10.48 
% Firms below quota 96.67 95.16 96.97 95.38 93.85 98.39 96.55 95 98.39 91.53 91.67 95.08 87.50 72.73 79.41 71.43 
Number of firms 60 62 66 65 65 62 58 60 62 59 60 61 64 66 68 70 
Notes. Variables are defined in Table 2.
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Table 4. Statistics on general board characteristics 
 Pre quota period  Post quota period  Difference-period
Age 
All 64.63 59.82 -4.81***
Male 66.62 62.31 -4.30***
Female 61.40 57.08 -4.32***
Difference-gender 5.21*** 5.23*** 
Foreign (%) 
All 8.85 10.81 1.96***
Male 8.97 9.88 0.90**
Female 8.65 11.84 3.18***
Difference-gender 0.31 -1.96*** 
Tenure 
All 4.74 4.64 -0.10
Male 4.86 5.52 0.66***
Female 4.55 3.66 -0.88***
Difference-gender 0.31** 1.85*** 
Time on Board 
All 5.99 5.89 -0.10
Male 6.40 7.39 0.98***
Female 5.33 4.25 -1.08***
Difference-gender 1.07*** 3.14*** 
Time in Company 
All 7.30 6.87 -0.43***
Male 7.73 8.59 0.86***
Female 6.60 4.98 -1.62***
Difference-gender 1.13*** 3.61*** 
 Independent (%) 
All 32.85 45.55 12.70***
Male 33.41 37.26 3.85***
Female 31.94 54.68 22.73***
Difference-gender 1.46 -17.41*** 
Notes. Variables are defined in Table 2.
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Table 5. Statistics on board members’ education and experience 
Panel A: Education 
 Pre quota period  Post quota period  Difference-period
Bachelor (%) 
All 40.14 40.94 0.80
Male 43.06 42.78 -0.27
Female 35.39 38.92 3.53***
Difference-gender 7.66*** 3.85*** 
PostGraduate (%) 
All 24.60 31.04 6.44***
Male 23.66 28.60 4.93***
Female 26.13 33.73 7.59***
Difference-gender -2.46** -5.12*** 
 
Panel B: Board experience 
 Pre quota period  Post quota period  Difference-period
Having board 
experience (%) 
All 86.80 84.12 -2.67***
Male 87.97 85.82 -2.14***
Female 84.90 82.25 -2.65***
Difference-gender 3.06*** 3.57*** 
Number BOD to 
Date 
All 9.57 8.30 -1.27***
Male 11.16 10.41 -0.75***
Female 6.98 5.97 -1.01***
Difference-gender 4.17*** 4.43*** 
Number current 
BOD 
(Occupation) 
All 4.29 3.88 -0.40***
Male 4.81 4.52 -0.29***
Female 3.43 3.18 -0.24***
Difference-gender 1.37*** 1.33*** 
CEO (%) 
All 5.22 7.93 2.70***
Male 6.36 9.41 3.05***
Female 3.37 6.30 2.92***
Difference-gender 2.98*** 3.11*** 
Chairman (%) 
All 12.47 13.39 0.92**
Male 15.13 18.20 3.06***
Female 8.14 8.11 -0.03
Difference-gender 6.98*** 10.08*** 
Vice 
Chairman/Vice 
CEO (%) 
All 14.07 17.94 3.87***
Male 14.68 18.14 3.46***
Female 13.08 17.72 4.64***
Difference-gender 1.59** 0.41 
Notes. Variables are defined in Table 2; BOD = board of directors.
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Table 6. Statistics on the education and experience of new, retained, and exiting directors 
Panel A: Education 
 Female Male Differences
New Retained Exiting New Retained Exiting New 
Female – 
New Male 
New 
Female – 
Retained 
Male 
New 
Female – 
Exiting 
Male
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) - (4) (1) - (5) (1) - (6)
Pre quota period 
Bachelor (%) 36.17 37.98 27.12 43.43 44.91 37.41 -7.26*** -8.74*** -1.24
Postgraduate (%) 31.98 23.99 24.86 26.54 23.83 22.44 5.44** 8.14*** 9.53***
Post quota period 
Bachelor (%) 39.51 40.18 37.38 39.31 44.79 39.64 0.22 -5.25*** -0.10
Postgraduate (%) 36.74 32.55 36.17 33.15 27.60 28.29 3.61** 9.17*** 8.48***
 
Panel B: Board experience 
 Female Male Differences
New Retained Exiting New Retained Exiting New 
Female – 
New Male 
New 
Female – 
Retained 
Male 
New 
Female – 
Exiting 
Male
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) - (4) (1) - (5) (1) - (6)
Pre quota period 
Having board 
experience (%) 86.43 83.40 88.98 87.70 87.16 89.35 -1.54 -0.56 -2.38
CEO (%) 5.38 3.13 4.05 9.00 5.96 9.03 -3.49** -0.30 -3.69**
Chairman (%) 7.00 10.99 9.32 15.30 15.64 15.32 -9.20*** -9.40*** -8.98***
Post quota period 
Having board 
experience (%) 82.84 81.59 83.75 87.30 85.07 86.93 -4.41*** -1.87*** -3.70***
CEO (%) 7.84 5.42 6.98 14.74 8.22 11.35 -6.53*** -0.29 -3.35***
Chairman (%) 6.86 7.45 10.76 17.29 17.85 18.30 -10.85*** -11.29*** -11.64***
Notes. Variables are defined in Table 2; BOD = board of directors.
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Table 7. Impact of gender quota on firm performance (staggered difference-in-differences 
estimates) 
 Tobin Q ROA Operating Profit
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
DQuota -0.00252  -0.00570 -0.00641 
 (-0.05)  (-0.75) (-0.88) 
DQuota[0;+2]  -0.00676 -0.00543  -0.00627
  (-0.15) (-0.72)  (-0.87)
DQuota[+3;T]  0.0388 -0.00824  -0.00779
  (0.59) (-0.75)  (-0.72)
Firm size -0.423*** -0.424*** 0.0445*** 0.0445*** 0.0520*** 0.0520***
 (-5.91) (-5.91) (4.43) (4.42) (5.08) (5.08)
Sales growth 0.0433 0.0433 0.0267*** 0.0267*** 0.0255*** 0.0255***
 (1.58) (1.58) (6.97) (6.98) (7.01) (7.01)
Leverage 0.799*** 0.796*** -0.295*** -0.295*** -0.218*** -0.218***
 (4.73) (4.72) (-7.78) (-7.79) (-6.33) (-6.33)
Cash 1.262*** 1.264*** 0.00286 0.00281 -0.0279 -0.0280
 (6.24) (6.25) (0.08) (0.08) (-0.81) (-0.82)
PPE 0.0387 0.0407 -0.0372 -0.0373 -0.00960 -0.00968
 (0.16) (0.17) (-0.86) (-0.86) (-0.19) (-0.19)
GDP 0.00132 0.00139 0.00133 0.00133 -0.000529 -0.000530
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.81) (0.81) (-0.35) (-0.35)
Constant 3.389*** 3.396*** -0.0922* -0.0926* -0.142*** -0.142***
 (9.57) (9.58) (-1.81) (-1.82) (-2.87) (-2.87)
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.189
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 8. Impact of gender quotas and changes in board characteristics on firm performance 
(staggered difference-in-differences estimates)  
 
Dependent variable Tobin Q ROA Operating Profit
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
Panel A: Relatively high proportion of younger directors 
DQuota 0.0166 -0.00348 -0.00446 
 (0.34) (-0.44) (-0.60) 
DQuota*dLowAge -0.0593 -0.00577 -0.00539 
 (-1.33) (-1.05) (-1.04) 
DQuota[0;+2]  0.0105 -0.00479  -0.00670
  (0.21) (-0.61)  (-0.89)
DQuota[0;+2]* dLowAge  -0.0533 -0.000754  0.00221
  (-1.08) (-0.12)  (0.38)
DQuota[+3;T]  0.0581 -0.00507  -0.00417
  (0.87) (-0.46)  (-0.38)
DQuota[+3;T]* dLowAge  -0.0624 -0.00906  -0.0109*
  (-1.18) (-1.33)  (-1.80)
Control variables Yes Yes   Yes  Yes
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.189 0.189 0.190 0.190
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Panel B: Relatively high proportion of foreign directors 
DQuota 0.0161 -0.00106 -0.00233 
 (0.28) (-0.13) (-0.32) 
DQuota*dHighForeign -0.0322 -0.00602 -0.00601 
 (-0.81) (-1.00) (-1.11) 
DQuota[0;+2]  0.0166 -0.00165  -0.00534
  (0.28) (-0.20)  (-0.70)
DQuota[0;+2]* dHighForeign  -0.0422 -0.00417  0.00110
  (-1.00) (-0.65)  (0.18)
DQuota[+3;T]  0.0554 -0.00261  0.0000555
  (0.72) (-0.22)  (0.01)
DQuota[+3;T]* dHighForeign  -0.0270 -0.00732  -0.0120*
  (-0.57) (-0.99)  (-1.90)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.189 0.189 0.190 0.190
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
 
Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
 35 
 
Table 8. Impact of gender quotas and changes in board characteristics on firm performance 
(staggered difference-in-differences estimates), continued 
 
Dependent variable Tobin Q ROA Operating Profit
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
Panel C: Relatively high proportion of directors with postgraduate degrees 
DQuota -0.0173 -0.00539 -0.00593
 (-0.35) (-0.71) (-0.83) 
DQuota*dHighEducation 0.0435 -0.0000708 -0.00113
 (1.10) (-0.01) (-0.23) 
DQuota[0;+2]  -0.00735 -0.00776  -0.00820
  (-0.14) (-1.02)  (-1.14)
DQuota[0;+2]* dHighEducation  0.000558 0.00801  0.00632
  (0.01) (1.27)  (1.05)
DQuota[+3;T]  0.0148 -0.00623  -0.00568
  (0.22) (-0.56)  (-0.53)
DQuota[+3;T]* dHighEducation  0.0704 -0.00492  -0.00603
  (1.50) (-0.84)  (-1.06)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.190
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Panel D: Relatively low proportion of directors with CEO/Chairman experience 
DQuota -0.00844  -0.00514  -0.00511  
 (-0.17) (-0.67) (-0.69) 
DQuota*dLowExperience 0.0100 -0.000841 -0.00371
 (0.35) (-0.19) (-0.87) 
DQuota[0;+2]  -0.000493 -0.00549  -0.00771
  (-0.01) (-0.70)  (-1.04)
DQuota[0;+2]* dLowExperience  -0.0267 0.00108  0.00494
  (-0.72) (0.20)  (1.03)
DQuota[+3;T]  0.0235 -0.00722  -0.00447
  (0.34) (-0.64)  (-0.40)
DQuota[+3;T]*dLowExperience  0.0308 -0.00193  -0.00915*
  (0.91) (-0.39)  (-1.84)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.190
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
 Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 8. Impact of gender quotas and changes in board characteristics on firm performance 
(staggered difference-in-differences estimates), continued 
 
Dependent variable Tobin Q ROA Operating Profit
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
Panel E: Relatively high proportion of independent directors 
DQuota -0.0167 -0.00624 -0.00640
 (-0.33) (-0.81) (-0.89)
DQuota* dHighIndependent 0.0433 0.00229 0.000287
 (0.97) (0.43) (0.05) 
DQuota[0;+2]  -0.0168 -0.00774  -0.00942
  (-0.32) (-0.99)  (-1.33)
DQuota[0;+2]* dHighIndependent  0.0299 0.00789  0.0105
  (0.71) (1.24)  (1.64)
DQuota[+3;T]  0.0232 -0.00720  -0.00526
  (0.34) (-0.65)  (-0.49)
DQuota[+3;T]* dHighIndependent  0.0525 -0.00122  -0.00669
  (0.96) (-0.19)  (-1.08)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.190
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
 Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 9. Impact of compliance with the law (staggered difference-in-differences estimates) 
Dependent variable Tobin Q ROA Operating Profit
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
Panel A: Firms complying with the law at the date of compliance 
DQuota -0.0268 -0.00229 -0.00444 
 (-0.55) (-0.29) (-0.56) 
DQuota*dComply 0.0736 -0.0105* -0.00605 
 (1.41) (-1.71) (-0.98) 
DQuota[0;+2]  -0.0256 -0.00382  -0.00757
  (-0.52) (-0.49)  (-1.02)
DQuota[0;+2]* dComply  0.0580 -0.00518  0.00364
  (1.13) (-0.81)  (0.58)
DQuota[+3;T]  0.0106 -0.00372  -0.00382
  (0.16) (-0.32)  (-0.33)
DQuota[+3;T]* dComply  0.0820 -0.0138*  -0.0129
  (1.28) (-1.76)  (-1.59)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.190
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Panel B: Exclude firms that respect the quota before the law
DQuota -0.00247 -0.00642 -0.00672 
 (-0.05) (-0.77) (-0.85) 
DQuota[0;+2]  -0.00583 -0.00623  -0.00677
  (-0.12) (-0.75)  (-0.87)
DQuota[+3;T]  0.0300 -0.00813  -0.00624
  (0.43) (-0.68)  (-0.53)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11639 11639 12529 12529 12112 12112
R-squared 0.167 0.167 0.188 0.188 0.191 0.191
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Panel B: Distance from compliance 
DQuota 0.00795  -0.00589  -0.00638  
 (0.17) (-0.77) (-0.88) 
DQuota*dDistCompliance -0.0608 0.00112 -0.000195
 (-0.92) (0.13) (-0.02) 
DQuota[0;+2]  0.0081 -0.0049  -0.00639
  (0.17) (-0.66)  (-0.89)
DQuota[0;+2]* dDistCompliance  -0.0969 -0.0040  0.0011
  -(1.73) (-0.52)  (0.15)
DQuota[+3;T]  0.0459 -0.0090  -0.0076
  (0.70) (-0.83)  (-0.72)
DQuota[+3;T]* dDistCompliance  -0.0398 0.0043  -0.00102
  (-0.47) (0.38)  (-0.09)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.190
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 10. Impact of gender quota on corporate strategy decisions (staggered difference-in-differences estimates)  
 Revenue Labor Cost Other Costs Employment
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
DQuota -0.0177 -0.00189 -0.0151 0.0320
 (-1.00) (-0.34) (-0.96) (0.79)
DQuota[0;+2]  -0.0157 -0.00248  -0.0141 0.0325
  (-0.89) (-0.45)  (-0.87) (0.81)
DQuota[+3;T]  -0.0361 0.00460  -0.0250 0.0269
  (-1.57) (0.61)  (-1.29) (0.45)
Firm size -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.0801*** -0.0803*** -0.199*** -0.199*** 0.704*** 0.705***
 (-7.91) (-7.89) (-9.31) (-9.33) (-12.60) (-12.56) (20.72) (20.77)
Sales growth 0.0294*** 0.0294*** -0.0101*** -0.0101*** -0.00357 -0.00356 -0.0448*** -0.0448***
 (3.86) (3.86) (-3.87) (-3.87) (-0.60) (-0.60) (-3.51) (-3.51)
Leverage 0.132** 0.133** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.313*** 0.314*** 0.268** 0.269**
 (1.98) (2.00) (4.41) (4.40) (6.41) (6.43) (2.30) (2.32)
Cash -0.170 -0.171 -0.0572 -0.0570 -0.245*** -0.245*** -0.173 -0.173
 (-1.63) (-1.64) (-1.64) (-1.64) (-3.22) (-3.22) (-1.21) (-1.21)
PPE 0.146 0.145 0.0476 0.0480 -0.0106 -0.0111 0.116 0.116
 (1.32) (1.31) (1.32) (1.33) (-0.12) (-0.12) (0.41) (0.41)
GDP 0.00136 0.00137 0.00141 0.00142 0.00393 0.00394 -0.00469 -0.00470
 (0.42) (0.42) (1.52) (1.55) (1.18) (1.18) (-0.63) (-0.63)
Constant 1.838*** 1.835*** 0.672*** 0.673*** 1.872*** 1.870*** 2.960*** 2.959***
 (15.55) (15.53) (15.22) (15.27) (17.79) (17.76) (13.06) (13.13)
Observations 13151 13151 12626 12626 13131 13131 13009 13009
R-squared 0.126 0.126 0.240 0.241 0.209 0.209 0.341 0.341
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
 
Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 11. Role of a critical mass effect 
Dependent variable Tobin Q ROA Operating Profit
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
DQuota (β1) -0.0495 -0.00125 -0.00301 
 (-0.97) (-0.15) (-0.38) 
DQuota*dCriticalMass (β2) 0.0974** -0.00935 -0.00722 
 (2.07) (-1.56) (-1.24) 
DQuota[0;+2] (β3)  -0.0435 -0.00088  -0.00361
  (-0.81) (-0.10)  (-0.45)
DQuota[0;+2]* dCriticalMass (β4)  0.0709 -0.00943  -0.00528
  (1.53) (-1.56)  (-0.89)
DQuota[+3;T] (β5)  -0.0139 -0.00420  -0.00407
  (-0.20) (-0.36)  (-0.36)
DQuota[+3;T]* dCriticalMass (β6)  0.118** -0.00952  -0.00877
  (2.05) (-1.28)  (-1.23)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.165 0.165 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.190
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Wald tests:   
β1 + β2 = 0 0.047 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.37) (0.19) (0.19) 
β3 + β4 = 0  0.027 -0.010  -0.009
  (0.57) (0.17)  (0.21)
β5 + β6 = 0  0.104 -0.013  -0.012
  (0.16) (0.23)  (0.26)
     Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses (p-values are in parentheses in the Wald tests), * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 12. Role of firms’ size 
Dependent variable Tobin Q ROA Operating Profit
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
DQuota  -0.0637 -0.00533 -0.00575 
 (-0.89) (-0.51) (-0.57) 
DQuota*dSize 0.0682 0.00190 0.00233 
 (1.19) (0.20) (0.26) 
DQuota[0;+2]  -0.0211 -0.00781  -0.0113
  (-0.26) (-0.71)  (-1.05)
DQuota[0;+2]* dSize  0.00283 0.00539  0.0100
  (0.04) (0.58)  (1.10)
DQuota[+3;T]  -0.0800 -0.00255  0.00136
  (-0.89) (-0.17)  (0.10)
DQuota[+3;T]* dSize  0.113* -0.000278  -0.00283
  (1.74) (-0.02)  (-0.26)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.109 0.109 0.164 0.164 0.146 0.146
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
     Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 13. Role of firms’ performance  
Dependent variable Tobin Q ROA Operating Profit
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
DQuota (β1) -0.0619 0.00351 0.000785 
 (-1.26) (0.39) (0.09) 
DQuota*dPerformance (β2) 0.101** -0.0159** -0.0124* 
 (2.22) (-2.27) (-1.93) 
DQuota[0;+2] (β3)  -0.0285 -0.0115  -0.0117
  (-0.49) (-1.17)  (-1.22)
DQuota[0;+2]* dPerformance (β4)  0.0428 0.00853  0.00785
  (0.90) (1.15)  (1.12)
DQuota[+3;T] (β5)  -0.0412 0.00927  0.00722
  (-0.60) (0.78)  (0.61)
DQuota[+3;T]* dPerformance (β6)  0.140** -0.0317***  -0.0268***
  (2.43) (-3.70)  (-3.46)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.165 0.165 0.189 0.192 0.190 0.193
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Wald tests:   
β1 + β2 = 0 0.0395 -0.0124 -0.0116 
 0.462 0.115 0.115 
β3 + β4 = 0  0.0143 -0.00298  -0.00385
  0.769 0.676  0.555
β5 + β6 = 0  0.0988 -0.0225  -0.0195
  0.183 0.0533  0.0816
     Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses (p-values are in parentheses in the Wald tests), * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 42 
 
Appendix A 
 
Table A1. Robustness test 1: placebo tests (staggered difference-in-differences estimates) 
Dependent variable Tobin Q ROA Operating Profit
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
Panel A: Placebo test, pre-reform period 
DQuota 0.0303  -0.00489 -0.00902 
 (0.57)  (-0.59) (-1.14) 
DQuota[0;+2] 0.0309 -0.00439  -0.00854
 (0.59) (-0.54)  (-1.10)
DQuota[+3;T] 0.0253 -0.00969  -0.0143
 (0.35) (-0.80)  (-1.20)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.189
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Panel B: Placebo test, post-reform period 
DQuota 0.0450  -0.00331 -0.00209 
 (0.96)  (-0.41) (-0.28) 
DQuota[0;+2] 0.0516 -0.00521  -0.00357
 (1.12) (-0.65)  (-0.47)
DQuota[+3;T] 0.00335 0.00826  0.00823
 (0.05) (0.73)  (0.73)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.189
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
     Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A2. Robustness test 2: alternative control group (difference-in-differences estimates) 
Panel A:  Mean tests on dependent variables to check the parallel trend  
Variables Mean of Treated 
group 
Mean of Control 
group 
Difference 
p-value 
Tobin-Q 1.449 1.391 0.499 
ROA -0.0004 0.0051 0.375 
Operating Profit 0.026 0.031 0.414 
Panel B: Difference-in-differences regressions 
Dependent variables Tobin Q ROA Operating Profits 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treated*Post 0.00783 -0.00516 0.00783 
 (0.20) (-0.97) (0.20) 
Post 0.0196 0.00208 0.0196 
 (1.19) (0.76) (1.19) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22280 23599 22280 
R-squared 0.122 0.165 0.122 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm 
  Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,  
  *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table A3. Robustness test 3: the year-specific effect of a gender quota (staggered difference-
in-differences estimates) 
Dependent variables Tobin Q ROA Operating Profits 
 (1) (2) (3) 
DQuota0 0.0286 0.00389 -0.00304 
 (0.59) (0.47) (-0.48) 
DQuota1 -0.00748 -0.00382 -0.00557 
 (-0.14) (-0.53) (-0.73) 
DQuota2 -0.0411 -0.0162 -0.0103 
 (-0.71) (-1.52) (-0.97) 
DQuota[+3;T] 0.0382 -0.00838 -0.00781 
 (0.58) (-0.76) (-0.72) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12248 13149 12714 
R-squared 0.164 0.188 0.189 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm 
  Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,  
  *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A4. Robustness test 4: standard errors clustered at either the country level or the 
industry sector level (staggered difference-in-differences estimates) 
 
Dependent variable Tobin Q ROA Operating Profit
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
Panel A: Standard errors cluster by industry sector
DQuota  -0.00252 -0.00570 -0.00641 
 (-0.06) (-1.00) (-1.65) 
DQuota[0;+2]  -0.00676 -0.00543  -0.00627
  (-0.17) (-1.03)  (-1.71)
DQuota[+3;T]  0.0388 -0.00824  -0.00779
  (0.51) (-0.59)  (-0.70)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.189
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Industry Industry Industry Industry  Industry  Industry
Panel B: Standard errors cluster by country 
DQuota  -0.00252 -0.00570 -0.00641 
 (-0.11) (-0.95) (-1.35) 
DQuota[0;+2]  -0.00676 -0.00543  -0.00627
  (-0.36) (-1.00)  (-0.44)
DQuota[+3;T]  0.0388 -0.00824  -0.00779
  (0.75) (-0.85)  (-0.98)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12248 12248 13149 13149 12714 12714
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.189
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Country Country Country Country Country Country 
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Table A5. Robustness test 5: sub-sample analysis (staggered difference-in-differences 
estimates) 
 
Dependent variable Tobin Q ROA Operating Profit
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2)
Panel A: Exclude French firms 
DQuota -0.00236 -0.00658 -0.00792 
 (-0.04) (-0.79) (-0.99) 
DQuota[0;+2] -0.00931 -0.00634  -0.00780
 (-0.18) (-0.77)  (-0.99)
DQuota[+3;T] 0.0374 -0.00788  -0.00863
 (0.49) (-0.69)  (-0.78)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5711 5711 6108 6108 5927 5927
R-squared 0.155 0.155 0.188 0.188 0.210 0.210
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Panel B: Using the [-5; 5] sample 
DQuota -0.00793 0.000670 -0.00207 
 (-0.37) (0.17) (-0.54) 
DQuota[0;+2] 0.0159 0.00482  0.000659
 (0.65) (1.10)  (0.16)
DQuota[+3;+5] 0.101 0.0198*  0.0106
 (1.51) (1.87)  (1.12)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 7297 7297 7858 7858 7823 7823
R-squared 0.195 0.196 0.165 0.166 0.187 0.187
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Panel C: At least one observation per firm in the pre-period and in the post-period
DQuota 0.00755 -0.00192 -0.00249 
 (0.20) (-0.25) (-0.35) 
DQuota[0;+2] 0.00647 -0.00200  -0.00253
 (0.17) (-0.26)  (-0.36)
DQuota[+3;T] 0.0207 -0.000961  -0.00203
 (0.37) (-0.09)  (-0.19)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11585 11585 12309 12309 11948 11948
R-squared 0.168 0.168 0.188 0.188 0.190 0.190
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
 
Note. Variables are defined in Table 2; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
